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Probate Court Jurisdiction: The Demise Of
The Privity Rule In Title Disputes
California's law on the issue of a probate court's jurisdiction to
try title to estate property when there is an adverse claimant has
recently been the object of statutory change. The "privily" rule
and its numerous exceptions led to Assembly Bill 1812 of 1972,
an attempt to abolish the previous case law distinctions by provid-
ing that a probate court has jurisdiction to try title to estate assets
whenever there is an adverse claimant to estate property. The
much-needed clarification in this area of probate court jurisdiction
may be threatened by the fact that a bill which proposes the enact-
ment of the Uniform Probate Code in California was introduced
in 1973, a bill which is a potential challenge to the existence of the
law as clarified by Assembly Bill 1812. This comment analyzes
the prior case law and its exceptions, explains the change in the
law by Assembly Bill 1812, and discusses the possible effect of en-
actment of the Uniform Probate Code on the issue of trying title.
Probate jurisdiction is in the superior court, and the probate court
is merely a department of the superior court exercising jurisdiction
over probate matters.' These matters are civil in nature, and the
superior court sitting in probate has the right to exercise its inherent
equitable functions as such.2 The probate court is sometimes called
a court of "limited jurisdiction" because its jurisdiction and powers
are wholly statutory, but this concept is somewhat misleading.3 The
court is still a constitutional court of general jurisdiction (i.e., a super-
ior court), and "within its proper sphere its judgments and orders
are protected by the same presumptions on collateral attack as those
1. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §5; CAL. PROB. CODE §300 et seq.; 4 WrrIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Wills and Probate §159 (7th ed. 1960). The superior
court sitting in probate has exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters, including for
example: probate of wills and lost wills; controversies relating to a representative's
administration of an estate; interpretation of wills; appointment of personal representa-
tives; determination of heirship; questions relating to settlement and distribution of
estates; setting apart homesteads; making of a family allowance; presentation, allowance,
and payment of creditors' claims; and compensation of the personal representative.
1 CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THlE BAR, CALIFORNA DECEDENT ESTATE ADMIlSTRATION
§5.15 (1971).
2. Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 273 P.2d 897 (1954).
3. See generally 4 WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate
§159 (7th ed. 1960); 1 CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DECEDENT
ESTATE ADiMINISTRATION §5.16 (1971).
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which apply to any other orders or judgments of the superior court."4
The only limitation is that its scope is statutory.
New legislation has expanded the powers of the probate court in
recent years, and many problems have arisen in defining the extent
of probate jurisdiction. During its 1972 regular session, the California
Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1812 which expanded the jurisdic-
tion of the probate court and attempted to resolve one problem pre-
sented by conflicting case law-whether or not the probate court has
jurisdiction to try title to assets in an estate when the person who
claims title to the property is a third person "not in privity to the pro-
ceedings." 5 Privity with the estate in this context means sufficient
connection with the probate proceeding so that the alleged claim may
be said to come through probate and not against it.8
In addition to the statutory powers, the superior court sitting in
probate has such incidental powers as are necessary to enable the court
to exercise any of the powers expressly conferred upon it.' Prior to
Assembly Bill 1812, the extent of the probate court's incidental pow-
ers was limited by the privity rule-when third persons claiming ad-
versely to the estate were involved, the probate court had no jurisdic-
tion to try title to the property.8 Assembly Bill 1812, which amends
Sections 851.5, 852, and 853 of the Probate Code, allows the probate
court to try title to property when there is an adverse claimant.
The purpose of this comment is to examine existing case law re-
garding the status of California probate court jurisdiction on the issue
of trying title to probate court assets when there is an adverse claimant,
to analyze the potential effect of Assembly Bill 1812 on such case
law, and to examine proposed changes in this area of law contained
in the Uniform Probate Code.
PROBATE JURISDICTION AND THE PRnVTY RULE
In the area of trying title to property, California law has followed the
general rule that the probate court has no jurisdiction to determine con-
troversies between the representative of the estate and a third person who
4. Estate of Kay, 30 Cal. 2d 215, 181 P.2d 1 (1947); CAL. PROB. CODE §§302,
1220; 4 WITKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §159 (7th ed.
1960).5. CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 641, at 1192.
6. Comment, An Extension of Probate Jurisdiction: Estate of Baglione, 7 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 275 n.4 (1966). For a discussion of cases which involve a "stranger"
to the probate proceedings, see generally 1 CONTINUING EDUCATION OF TiE BAR,
CALIFORNIA DECEDENT ESTATE ADMINISTRATION §5.18 (1971).
7. See generally CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§128, 177; 1 CONTINUING EDUCATION
OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DECEDENT ESTATE ADMINISTRATION §5.17 (1971).
8. Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14, 285 P.2d 906, 908 (1955);
Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 372, 273 P.2d 897, 903 (1954).
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is "not in privity with the proceedings," i.e., a stranger who claims title
to property.9 The rationale is that the probate court handles the settle-
ment of an estate, not the resolution of controversies between the estate
and strangers, which is the function of courts of general jurisdiction. 10
A "stranger" to the probate proceedings may be a child of the dece-
dent or his surviving spouse.1" A typical situation is where a stranger
claims that the decedent made an agreement or contract to leave a
will in his favor and instead the decedent left the property to others,
either by will or succession. The heirs, devisees, or legatees are en-
titled to distribution irrespective of the rights of the claimant which
could only be asserted in a separate action seeking quasi-specific per-
formance of the agreement; 2 one over whose claims the probate court
has no jurisdiction is not bound by that court's adjudications."3 In
these cases (at least prior to Assembly Bill 1812, discussed in detail
later), the procedure was to file in the superior court of general juris-
diction a civil action against the administrator. 4 After it was deter-
mined in the proper proceeding that decedent was not the owner of
the property at the time of his death, the item of property was no
longer an "asset" of the estate and the probate court no longer had
jurisdiction over it.
A. Statutory Exceptions Prior to Assembly Bill 1812
Notwithstanding the general rule that the probate court has no juris-
diction to try title to property,' 5 the California Legislature enacted
several statutes which authorized a probate court to transfer a de-
cedent's property under limited circumstances. Pursuant to Probate
9. Estate of Hart, 51 Cal. 2d 819, 823, 337 P.2d 73, 76 (1959); Central Bank v.
Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14, 285 P.2d 906, 908 (1955); Estate of Dabney, 37
Cal. 2d 672, 676, 234 P.2d 962, 965 (1951); Bauer v. Bauer, 201 Cal. 267, 256 P. 820
(1927).
10. Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 15, 285 P.2d 906, 908-09
(1955); Comment, An Extension of Probate Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 275.
11. In Estate of Hart, 51 Cal. 2d 819, 337 P.2d 73 (1959), a wife predeceased her
husband, who then died. The husband's administrator claimed property in the wife's
estate as either his separate property or as community property vesting in the husband
as survivor. The proper procedure was held to be a separate civil action. In Merola v.
Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 2d 1, 269 P.2d 664 (1954), the probate court was held
to have no jurisdiction to consider the claim of a widow to joint tenancy property as
she was claiming adversely to the estate. See also, Estate of Dalton, 87 Cal. App. 2d
333, 197 P.2d 62 (1948).
12. Estate of King, 199 Cal. 113, 118-19, 248 P. 519, 521 (1926); Estate of
Ross, 180 Cal. 643, 648-49, 182 P. 755, 758-59 (1919); Estate of Cropper, 83 Cal.
App. 2d 105, 187 P.2d 780 (1947).
13. Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal. 2d 672, 676, 234 P.2d 962, 966 (1951); Texas Co.
v. Bank of America Ass'n, 5 Cal. 2d 35, 46, 53 P.2d 127, 133 (1935); 4 WrrnIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §164 (7th ed. 1960).
14. See Estate of Hart, 51 Cal. 2d 819, 337 P.2d 73 (1959); 4 Wrrni,, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §164 (7th ed. 1960).
15. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF TE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1965 CODE
LEGISLATION 221.
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Code Section 850, the court was permitted to authorize transfer of
a decedent's property by the personal representative in uncontested
cases in which a decedent had previously executed a specifically en-
forceable contract in writing."8 However, in the absence of a written
contract to convey, if a decedent were to die in possession of or
holding title to property that belonged to a third person, the probate
court had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue. In such a case, even
if there were no factual dispute, a separate quiet title action in the
superior court was necessary, thereby causing additional expense and
delay. 17  This problem occurred most frequently when the property
at issue was in the possession of a deceased bailee or deceased result-
ing trustee, or was property which decedent held in title for conveni-
ence. 
8
Probate Code Section 851.5,'" proposed to the legislature by the
State Bar of California in 1965, was designed to remove this burden
of extra expense and delay in certain limited situations. The section
authorized the probate court to approve uncontested transfers of prop-
erty held by a decedent but owned by another, even in the absence
of a written contract to convey. However, under Section 851.5 only
the decedent's personal representative was authorized to file a petition
to approve the transfer and was required to mail notice of the peti-
tion to all known heirs and devisees. Moreover, the claimant was
to have executed an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts set
out in the petition of the representative.20 The court was required
to disapprove the petition if it was not satisfied that the conveyance
or transfer should be made.2'
Sections 852 and 853 were amended in 1965 to provide a procedure
for a hearing and issuance of a decree ordering the conveyance of
the property, as was previously provided in cases where the decedent
was bound by a contract to transfer the property.2 At the same time
Probate Code Section 851.5 was enacted, Section 852 was amended
to limit the probate court's authority to approve petitions. A court
could not approve a petition if: (1) objection to it was made; (2)
16. Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal. App. 2d 468, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965) (this
remedy is not exclusive); Estate of Roche, 202 Cal. App. 2d 295, 20 Cal. Rptr. 775
(1962) (the section does not apply when the right to specific performance is doubtful).
17. 4 WrhIN, SUMMARY OF CA~nORNuA LAW, Wills and Probate §§159, 164
(7th ed. 1960), (Supp. 1969).
18. CoNTn-UING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1965 CODE
LEGISLATION 221.
19. A.B. 616, CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1901, §1, at 4409.
20. Id.
21. See A.B. 616, CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1901, §2, at 4410; 1 CONTINUING EDU-
CATION OF THE Ba, CALiFo Gu DECEDENT ESTATE ADmIISTRATION §5.24 et seq.
(1971).
22. CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1901, §§2, 3, at 4410.
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a civil action was pending with reference to the matter; or (3) the
court determined that the matter should have been decided in a regular
civil action. If an interested party objected to a stranger's petition
to determine his title, the probate court automatically lost jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the history of hearings on the proposal by the State
Bar Committee on Administration of Justice indicated that the intent
of Probate Code Section 851.5 was not to vest the probate court with
jurisdiction to try title.23  The committee expressed the opinion that
the petition by the personal representative (for transfer) should not
be filed unless the personal representative was convinced of the merits
of the third party's claim;24 the procedure was not intended as a means
to try title in the probate court when there was a dispute or doubt
as to facts.
B. Judicial Exceptions
Case law has engrafted several well-established exceptions upon the
general privity rule, in addition to the statutory exceptions provided
by Probate Code Sections 850 and 851.5. These exceptions are based
upon sufficient connection or privity between the pending probate pro-
ceedings and the controversy at issue.2 5
First, sufficient connection to establish privity may arise out of the
relationship between the parties to the controversy. Under the first
exception the superior court sitting in probate can try the issue of
title in a dispute between the estate and its personal representative
claiming adversely in his individual capacity.2 6 This exception is
based on the rationale that the determination of such a controversy
is incidental to the proper settlement of the estate. 7 All of the parties
are in privity to the estate, and it is their distributive rights that are
affected by the proceedings in probate. A judgment outside probate
proceedings would be binding only on the parties thereto, whereas
23. 38 CAL. S.B.J. 499, 500 (1963); 36 CAL. S.B.J. 422 (1961); STATE BAR OF
CALiFoRNA, 1960 CONFE ENCE RESOLUTION No. 25.
24. 38 CAL. S.B.J. 499, 500 (1963).
25. Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 15, 285 P.2d 906, 909
(1955); Comment, An Extension of Probate Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 275.
26. Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 372-73, 273 P.2d 897, 902-03 (1954);
Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150-51, 99 P. 512, 514-15 (1909); Estate of
Pieper, 224 Cal. App. 2d 670, 681, 37 Cal. Rptr. 46, 54 (1964).
27. Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 373, 273 P.2d 897, 903 (1954), wherein
the probate court had jurisdiction when children of a deceased brought an action
against deceased's widow, who was also executrix under the will of the deceased, for
cancellation of deeds which had been executed by deceased to make the widow and
children joint tenants of two parcels. The widow claimed under the deeds, and the
children alleged fraud and undue influence by the widow. In Stevens v. Superior
Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150-51, 99 P. 512, 514 (1909), an executor was charged with
failure to account for certain personal property which it was alleged belonged to the
estate, for which reason it was sought to remove him.
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the probate decree is conclusive against all persons interested in the
estate.2" Neither the resignation nor removal of the executor divests
the court of jurisdiction over him prior to the settlement of his ac-
counts.29 However, where the representative claims on behalf of a
third person and not in his individual capacity, the general rule gov-
erns.
30
A second exception based on the theory of a sufficient relationship
between the parties is that a probate court may determine whether
an assignment or other transfer of an interest of an heir, legatee, or
devisee to a third party is valid and order distribution accordingly."
Sufficient connection to establish privity may also arise out of the
nature of the claim to the property. The probate court has jurisdiction
"where the property involved is conceded by both parties to be or
to have been acquired by the claimant in the course of probate proceed-
ings.".32  For example, such a situation exists where a distributee has
received property of the estate under a decree which is afterwards
set aside.
33
The fourth exception contains a confusing distinction made with
respect to the power of the probate court to determine whether or
not property is community property. The superior court sitting in
probate can determine the claim of a surviving wife to her share of
the community property in the estate of her deceased husband and
award it to her.34 The theory is that where the wife survives, com-
munity property coming to her is subject to administration.3 5 The
wife's claim to her share of the community property is not that of
a stranger, but is rather like the claim of an heir.36
However, there is no jurisdiction in the probate court to determine
the claim of a surviving husband to community property because his
28. CAL. PROB. CODE §931.
29. Waterland v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 34, 98 P.2d 211 (1940); 4 WITIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §165 (7th ed. 1960).
30. Estate of Inghilleri, 27 Cal. App. 2d 664, 81 P.2d 568 (1938) (executor
claimed estate as trustee of a trust created by decedent during his lifetime).
31. Where an agreement embraces both property that is a part of the estate and
property which is not a part of the estate, especially community property, the probate
court has jurisdiction to decide the validity of the entire agreement. If jurisdiction over
the entire controversy is denied delay, confusion, and uncertainty follow. Estate of
Stanley, 34 Cal. 2d 311, 318-19, 209 P.2d 941, 945 (1949).
32. Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 3, 8, 314 P.2d 10, 13-14 (1957);
Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 16-18, 285 P.2d 906, 909-10 (1955)
(exception held inapplicable); Estate of DeBarry, 43 Cal. App. 2d 715, 725-26, 111
P.2d 728, 736 (1941).
33. Comment, An Extension of Probate Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 276.
34. Estate of Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 393-96, 44 P. 734, 735 (1896); Colden v.
Costello, 50 Cal. App. 2d 363, 369, 122 P.2d 959, 963-64 (1942).
35. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§201, 202, 203.
36. 4 WiTIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills! and Probate §167 (7th ed.
1960).
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share of community property vests in him without administration.7
In this respect the husband is considered a stranger to his wife's estate,
claiming adversely to it.8 An argument may be made, especially in
view of the proposed twenty-seventh amendment to the United States
Constitution (equal rights amendment), that this distinction is artificial
and may become unconstitutional if the amendment passes. Thus,
arguably, the Probate Code needs to be changed in this area.
A fifth exception to the privity rule, in which there is the greatest
conflicting case authority, concerns a probate court's jurisdiction to
determine contractual claims that are adverse to an estate. In 1956
the California Supreme Court in Woods v. Security First National
Bank39 held that if a surviving spouse, husband or wife, invokes pro-
bate court jurisdiction by asserting a substantive right in property or
assets as an heir, legatee, or devisee, jurisdiction is not lost if that
spouse also presents an adverse contractual claim against the estate.
He or she may also obtain a judgment in that court determining
any additional claims that he asserts against those in privity with the
estate in the same property. Subsequent to the Woods decision, and
in conflict with it, two cases-Sieroty -v. Silver40 and Smith v. Smith
41
-held that probate court jurisdiction was lost by the presence of an
adverse contractual claim.42  Thus the answer to the problem of how
37. See 4 WrT-nw, SuMvARY OF CALFORNIA LAw, Community Property §§77, 78
(7th ed. 1960).
38. Estate of Stone, 170 Cal. App. 2d 533, 339 P.2d 220 (1959); Wilson v.
Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 2d 592, 225 P.2d 1002 (1951); Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal.
App. 2d 681, 683, 189 P.2d 528, 530 (1948).
39. 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956). A wife, prior to marriage, made her
will and, as alleged by her husband, entered into an oral agreement that if they were
married all of her property would become community property and would become
husband's property after the wife's death. The parties were married, but the wife
neglected to change her will and did not part with control over her property nor transfer
it to her husband. The wife then died. The supreme court held that the husband's
claim as intestate heir under his wife's will (by Probate Code Section 70) was sufficient
to invoke probate court jurisdiction initially, and that the court could then also litigate
the validity of the oral agreement even though the claim was adverse to the wife's
estate.
40. 58 Cal. 2d 799, 376 P.2d 563, 26 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1962). In an action
between the executors of an estate and decedent's widow to obtain the proceeds of
life insurance policies, the court held that the probate court did not have jurisdiction
of the widow's claim because her claim was not in privity with the estate. The widow
alleged that she and her husband had agreed to make mutual irrevocable wills and
that her husband agreed to take out life insurance with his wife as beneficiary. The
widow claimed the entire proceeds of the policy as her separate property. The court
held that the probate court had no jurisdiction to decide this claim.
41. 220 Cal. App. 2d 30, 33 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1963). In an action for declaratory
relief the court held that the probate court in heirship proceedings could not properly
receive evidence concerning an alleged oral agreement to devise and bequeath property.
The court lacked jurisdiction to determine the rights of the party claiming adversely
to the estate. The rights of that party had to be determined in an independent action
in equity in which the right to quasi-specific performance could be decided. The
decree determining heirship was not res judicata of appellant's claims regarding the oral
agreement.
42. Comment, An Extension of Probate Jurisdiction, supra note,6, at 278.
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to treat an adverse contractual claim when jurisdiction was invoked
initially by another claim remained unclear.
Against this background, the California Supreme Court decided the
leading case of Estate of Baglione.4 s In that case, a widow sought
to establish her right to succeed to real property in her deceased
husband's estate by virtue of an alleged oral contract made between the
husband and wife during their marriage. The court concluded that
once the probate court determined that the wife was entitled to at
least a community share of the property, it should have determined
any other interests she had in the same property under the alleged
oral contract with the deceased. 44
Relying on Woods, the court indicated that a probate court has
jurisdiction to determine a stranger's claim to property if such determi-
nation is necessary and proper to a complete judgment, but only if
the stranger's claim bears a particular relationship to the estate.4" Thus
the court in Baglione allowed the probate court to retain jurisdiction
over an adverse contractual claim when the spouse asserted other sub-
stantive rights to invoke probate jurisdiction.46
Baglione rationalized this exception to the general privity rule by
permitting the probate court to retain jurisdiction in order to prevent
multiplicity of suits and conserve the time, energy, and money of all
concerned: "a claimant is not required to sever and litigate a multi-
faceted claim in separate proceedings once all the necessary parties
are before the court. 47  Any contrary statements in Sieroty and Smith
were disapproved.48 If Baglione is not limited to its facts alone (al-
leged claim by surviving spouse to property of a decedent), the ambi-
guity in this area of probate court jurisdiction may be resolved by
case law.49 The holding in Baglione indicated that for the probate
court to have jurisdiction the claimant need not necessarily be in privity
with the estate.
43. 65 Cal. 2d 192, 417 P.2d 683, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1966). During their
marriage husband and wife bought a parcel of real property with community property
earnings and took title as joint tenants. Later the husband severed the joint tenancy
during a period of domestic difficulty. The wife alleged that prior to the difficulty
she and her husband had made an oral agreement that the survivor would succeed
to all property acquired by the parties during the marriage. However, the husband
made a will leaving his share of the real property to certain relatives.
44. Id. at 195, 417 P.2d at 686, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
45. Id. at 196, 417 P.2d at 687, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 143. This relationship involves a
situation that when a party invokes the jurisdiction of the probate court by asserting a
substantive right in a particular piece of property or in certain assets as an heir,
legatee, or devisee, he may also obtain a judgment in that court to determine any addi-
tional claims that he asserts against those in privity with the estate in the same
property. Comment, An Extension of Probate Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 275.
46. 65 Cal. 2d at 197, 417 P.2d at 687, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
47. Id. at 197, 417 P.2d at 687, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
48. Id.
49. See Comment, An Extension of Probate Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 280-81.
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In In re Estate of Casella 50 a widow alleged that all of her deceased
husband's property was community property and that a quitclaim deed
from the wife to her husband covering the wife's interest in joint ten-
ancy property was fraudulently obtained. The court stated that it
is clear that Baglione has changed the rule requiring privity with the
estate in order to give the probate court jurisdiction to try claims of
a surviving spouse to the property of the decedent. The probate court
had jurisdiction to consider decedent's widow's claim to her spouse's
joint tenancy property along with her petition to determine heirship
(i.e., status of decedent's property), notwithstanding the fact that
the widow was claiming adversely to the estate and not in privity with
it regarding the joint tenancy property. Certainly, based on Casella
an argument can be made that Baglione may still be limited to its
factual situation-i.e., alleged contract or transfer between spouses.
However, it is important to note that Baglione will not solve the
problem of a surviving husband who wishes to assert community prop-
erty rights in his wife's estate without initially invoking probate court
jurisdiction in some other manner since he is considered an adverse
claimant to her estate. Nor would Baglione provide a solution to
a case which did not involve breach of a contract by a spouse to
leave property by will to the surviving spouse.
Finally, "something akin to an exception to the general rule of priv-
ity" was established in Estate of Hart.51 In Hart a husband and
wife died within a few days of each other, and the administratrix of
the wife's estate took possession of assets which allegedly belonged
to the husband's estate. The husband's administrator then com-
menced an action for their recovery. In the interim between the first
and second accounts of the administratix, the administrator of the
husband's estate obtained a judgment declaring that he was the owner
of almost the entire estate, and to the extent that the administrator
was the judgment creditor for his costs of suit, he would have a
right to appear and object as would any other creditor whose claim
originally arose against the estate during the administration. The court
held that after a stranger has established his title to an estate property
by a judgment in a civil action, he is a person interested in the estate
and entitled to appear in the probate proceedings and object to a repre-
50. 256 Cal. App. 2d 312, 64 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1967). The wife contended that
she was entitled (as surviving joint tenant) to the property which was in joint tenancy
with her husband. The devisees of the husband contended that the court had no
jurisdiction to do anything other than to determine whether the properties of the
estate were either community or separate property and had no right to vest the joint
tenancy property in wife as surviving joint tenant.
51. 51 Cal. 2d 819, 337 P.2d 73 (1959). See generally, 4 WrrIN, SuMMARY
op CALiFoRNrA LAW, Wills and Probate §164 (7th ed. 1960).
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sentative's account.52
ASSEMBLY BILL 1812
The large number of case law exceptions engrafted upon the general
privity rule may have been an indication to the California Legislature
and the State Bar of California that the general rule against allowing
probate court jurisdiction in adverse claims to an estate was unsatisfac-
tory and unworkable. As previously stated, prior to Assembly Bill
1812 a judgment made in probate bound all parties interested in
an estate, but one who claimed adversely to the estate property was
not bound by the probate court order of distribution, unless he quali-
fied under one of the above-mentioned exceptions and could litigate
the claim in the probate proceeding itself. His remedy was a civil
suit in the superior court's general jurisdiction. However, the judg-
ment in such a case bound only those actually joined therein. In
Estate of McLennan53 the court held that since the probate court's
jurisdiction is concurrent with the superior court's jurisdiction in the
exercise of its general equitable powers, the probate court may stay
its proceeding pending the trial of the separate civil quiet title action.
An argument certainly can be made, as it was in several of the
cases establishing the exceptions to the general rule, that this procedure
creates multiplicity of suits and unnecessary time expended by all par-
ties. One author has suggested, "When a party is before the probate
court for one reason, any controversy related to the estate should also
be litigated."54  Perhaps this logic could be extended to include all
cases in which the claimant could not get before the probate court
for any reason but had an interest related to the estate which was
adverse to it.
During the 1972 legislative session, the California Legislature speci-
fically addressed itself to the above problem. The State Bar of Cali-
fornia recommended amendments to Sections 851.5, 852, and 853
of the Probate Code.55 These amendments authorized probate courts
to determine title to real or personal property, title or possession of
which is held by another, to which the decedent or a third party
had a disputed claim.
As a result of these recommendations, Section 851.5 of the Probate
Code has been amended to provide a procedure whereby "any claim-
ant, not merely the personal representative, may file a petition to have
52. 51 Cal. 2d at 825, 337 P.2d at 77.
53. 29 Cal. App. 2d 666, 85 P.2d 499 (1938).
54. Comment, An Extension of Probate Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 281.
55. STATE BAR OF CALuFOuqIA, 1967 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION No. 65.
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his interest litigated in the probate proceedings, even where the party
asserting the interest is claiming adversely to the estate and not in
privity with it."56  The petitioner shall cause notice of the hearing to
be published, pursuant to Section 6063 of the Government Code, in
a newspaper published in the county where the proceedings are pend-
ing. If there is no such newspaper, notice shall be posted at three
of the most public places in the county. A copy of the petition is
to be mailed to all known heirs, devisees, legatees, and the personal
representative of the estate, whether requested or not. Section 851.5
further states that any interested person may request, and the court
shall grant, a continuance for a reasonable period of time to file a
response.
Even under the new procedure set forth by Section 851.5, jurisdic-
tion over controversies to try title is not exclusive in the probate court
even when there is an adverse claimant. Prior to Assembly Bill 1812,
as discussed above, the probate court did not have exclusive jurisdiction
over controversies to try title.57 This particular jurisdictional problem
arose in 1954 in Schlyen v. Schlyen,58 where the court held that the
probate court did not have exclusive jurisdiction to litigate the validity
of certain joint tenancy deeds claimed by decedent's children to have
been fraudulently obtained from decedent by his widow, who claimed
title to the property in her individual capacity and also acted as per-
sonal representative of the estate. Where the superior court has
jurisdiction over the particular class of cases in question, it is the well-
established rule that if no objection is timely made on the ground
of another action pending or other appropriate grounds, the objection
is deemed to be waived.59 In this case, i.e., trying title when the
parties are in privity with the estate, the jurisdiction of the probate
court is concurrent with that of the superior court exercising its general
jurisdiction; if no timely objection is made, and the matter is being
litigated in the general superior court, this type of jurisdiction (like
venue matters) may be waived in favor of the superior court exercising
its general jurisdiction.
This jurisdictional problem is explicitly referred to by language in-
cluded in the amended Section 851.5. New language in that section
states that any person having or claiming title to or an interest in the prop-
erty which is the subject of the petition may, at or prior to the hearing,
object to the hearing of the petition if such petition is filed in a court
56. A.B. 1812, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 641, at 1192 (emphasis added).
57. 1 CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNiA DECEDENT ESTATE AD-
MINISTRATION §5.15 (1971).
58. 43 Cal. 2d 361, 273 P.2d 897 (1954).
59. Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 377, 273 P.2d 897, 905 (1954).
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which is not the proper court under any other provision of law for the
trial of a civil action seeking the same relief. If such objection is estab-
lished, the court shall not grant relief. If any civil action is pending
on the subject matter of such petition, the court shall abate the peti-
tion until the civil action is concluded.
Prior to Assembly Bill 1812, if a person died in County A and
had a claim to property in County B, the interested parties who resided
in County B could be compelled to come to County A to litigate
the matter. This problem was resolved by Assembly Bill 1812 which
permits one to object to venue, thereby causing the probate court to
lose authority to continue the litigation. Under Assembly Bill 1812
the matter could now be litigated in County B by a court sitting
in its general jurisdiction.
Sections 852 and 853 were also amended by Assembly Bill 1812
to conform the procedural details to the amended procedure of Section
851.5. Section 852 provides a procedure whereby a probate court,
if satisfied that a conveyance, transfer, or other order should be made,
shall make an order authorizing and directing the executor, administra-
tor, or other claimant to execute same to the party entitled thereto,
or grant appropriate relief; however, the probate court shall not grant
a petition under Section 851.5 if it determines that the matter should
be resolved by civil action in the superior court. Section 853 specifies
that the order is prima facie evidence of the authority of the person
to make the conveyance. After entry of the order, the person entitled
thereunder has the right to possession of the property and to hold
same according to the terms of the order as if it had already been
conveyed. The conveyance or order shall pass title to the property
as fully as if the decedent had executed it while living.
Assembly Bill 1812 amends Section 1240 of the Probate Code to
provide that an appeal from an order adjudicating the merits of any
claim under Sections 851.5, 852, and 853 may be made.
A. Opposition to Assembly Bill 1812
The State Bar Committee on Administration of Justice was opposed
to the statutory changes created by Assembly Bill 1812 on the theory
that Baglione and Casella had already expanded the jurisdiction of
the probate court as far as could reasonably be expected.O The Com-
mittee reasoned that the matter of title or possession to estate property
in contested matters should not be treated any differently than contro-
versies involving persons in being simply because of involvement in
60. STATE BAR OF CALiFoRNA, 1967 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION No. 65.
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probate proceedings, i.e., they should be left as civil actions and tried
by courts having experience and an established routine to try title.6
In this connection, it was expressed that to provide such summary
procedure in the probate court would unduly prolong probate proce-
dures, would deprive litigants of a jury trial and other rights inherent
in contested litigation, and would unduly inflate attorneys' extraordi-
nary fees at the expense of the estate beneficiaries who would other-
wise not be involved.
62
1. Jury Trial
The Committee on Administration of Justice merely attempted to
point out that the right to a jury trial exists in certain proceedings
to try title in both probate and civil courts and that such right may
not be constitutionally denied if it does exist. Nothing in Sections
851.5, 852, or 853 specifically refers to this problem; however, by
utilizing Sections 592 and 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it can
be argued that this right still exists, and the new probate procedure
should not be used to deny the right to a jury trial in cases where
the right now exists.
Generally speaking, proceedings concerning probate and the admin-
istration of estates are conducted by the judge of the probate court.
6 3
The right to a jury trial is available in proceedings in the probate
court in two cases:0 4 (1) where expressly provided for by statute,
e.g., Probate Code Section 928 permits a jury trial whenever an
allowed claim is contested by any person entitled to contest it; and (2)
Probate Code Section 1230 applies the rules of civil procedure to the
formulation of issues of fact in probate proceedings, including the
right to a jury trial on such issues. This section states that when
a party is entitled to a trial by jury, a jury is demanded, and the
issues are not sufficiently made up by the written pleadings on file,
the court on due notice must settle and frame the issues to be tried.
If no jury trial is demanded, the court must try the issues joined and
sign and file a written decision.
Section 592 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which would control
the granting of a jury trial under Probate Code Section 1230, states
that in actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property,
61. STATE BAR OF CALiFORNmA, 1968 CONFERENCE COM IEE REPORT re 1967
CONFERENCE RESOLUTION No. 65.
62. STATE BAR oF CALiFORNIA, 1967 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION No. 65.
63. 4 WrrKrN, CALFORNmA PROCEDURE, Trial §79 (2d ed. 1971).
64. See e.g., Swift v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 2d 358, 361, 247 P.2d 6 (1952)
(involves CAL. PROB. CODE §371); 4 WTrIN, CALIFORNA PROCEDURE, Trial §79 (2d
ed. 1971).
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with or without damages, or for money claimed due upon a contract,
or for injuries, an issue of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury
trial is waived or a reference is ordered as provided in the Code of
Civil Procedure. If in these cases there are issues both of law and
fact, the issue of law must be disposed of first.
Generally, as a matter of right, a party to a civil case is entitled
to a jury trial on the issues raised by an action at law, but not regard-
ing issues in equity.65 However, the question of a jury trial is some-
what unclear concerning actions to quiet title to property. Section
738 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that in quiet title actions
the right to a jury trial cannot be taken away in any case where the
right is now given. The Committee on Administration of Justice rec-
ognized that a simple action to quiet title where possession of prop-
erty is not involved is equitable, and there is no right to a jury trial.0
However, under Probate Code Section 851.5 both questions of title
and possession may be involved. If the right to recover possession
is at issue, a jury trial is normally available. 7  Where the action is
of hybrid character raising both legal and equitable issues, a party
is entitled to a jury trial on the severable issues of fact. 8 If a prior
resolution of the equitable issues is determinative of the legal issues,
a jury trial of the legal issues might be obviated within the discretion
of the court.69 Unwarranted denial or curtailment of the right to
a jury trial is not only reversible error, but is also an act in excess
of jurisdiction subject to restraint by prohibition. 7
2. Inflated Expenses
It was also argued by the Committee on Administration of Justice
that the new procedure in probate would unduly inflate attorneys' ex-
traordinary fees at the expense of the estate beneficiaries who would
otherwise not be involved. Presently, Probate Code Section 902 al-
65. Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 911, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366,
369 (1965). See also CAL. CONST. art. I, §7.
66. Dills v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 302 P.2d 397 (1956); McNeil v.
Dow, 89 Cal. App. 2d 370, 200 P.2d 859 (1949).
67. Medeiros v. Medeiros, 177 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72, 1 Cal. Rptr. 696, 698 (1960).
68. Robinson v. Puls, 28 Cal. 2d 664, 665, 171 P.2d 430, 431 (1946); Veale v.
Piercy, 206 Cal. App. 2d 557, 562, 24 Cal. Rptr. 91, 94 (1962); 4 WrnrN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Trial §77 (2d ed. 1971).
69. Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 609, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25, 36
(1966).
70. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 300, 231 P.2d 832, 844
(1951); Redondo Beach v. Kurnnick, 216 Cal. App. 2d 830, 833, 839, 31 Cal. Rptr.
367, 371, 372 (1963); Mallarino v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 2d 781, 785, 252
P.2d 993, 995 (1953); Budde v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 2d 615, 622, 218 P.2d
103, 107 (1950); 1 WrrIlN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction §§198, 270 (2d ed.
1971); CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE DURING TRIAL, Jury
Selection §5.3 et seq. (1960).
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lows additional compensation to an executor or administrator for addi-
tional functions performed in connection with "contested or litigated
claims against the estate," "litigation in regard to the property of the
estate," "and such other litigation or special services as may be neces-
sary for the executor or administrator to prosecute, defend or perform."
This extra compensation is paid from the funds of the estate.
As far as attorneys' fees are concerned, Probate Code Section 910
authorizes such fees for conducting ordinary probate proceedings at
a fixed sum-the same sum as authorized for executors and adminis-
trators in Probate Code Section 901. Section 910 also authorizes such
extraordinary fees as the court may deem just and reasonable for extra-
ordinary services. The Committee on Administration of Justice ar-
gued that by involvement in the new probate procedure in which title
can be tried by any claimant, the attorney for the estate would then
be entitled to receive extraordinary fees from the estate at the expense
of the estate beneficiaries; the facility with which such issue could
be brought before the probate court, as per Section 851.5, would cause
an increase in such litigation, thus increasing fees.
3. Court Delay
Finally, the Committee argued that the procedure established by
Section 851.5 may work a hardship on heirs who would otherwise
receive distribution much earlier, since all adverse claims may now
be litigated within the probate proceedings in addition to the normal
probate matters.
B. Support of Assembly Bill 1812
The position adopted by the State Bar of California Committee on
Probate and Trust Law, which favored amendment of Section 851.5,
prevailed over dissenters thereto and resulted in Assembly Bill 1812.
Apparently one of the decisive factors in this position was that the
case of Baglione was unclear and recognized so many exceptions to
the general privity rule that ascertainment of the precise limits of pro-
bate court jurisdiction had become increasingly difficult.
The rationale for the exceptions, as stated in Baglione, is the con-
servation of time, energy, and money of all concerned, and prevention
of a multiplicity of actions. To deny a superior court sitting in probate
the power to determine the whole controversy between the parties is
pointless. The Committee argued that the procedure established by
Section 851.5 will avoid multiple actions and, contrary to the statements
of the Committee on Administration of Justice, will expedite disposi-
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tions of title matters arising in probate proceedings rather than prolong
them.71  For example, a husband claiming adversely to a deceased
wife's estate may have his adverse claim litigated in the probate court
without initially invoking probate court jurisdiction in some other
manner since pursuant to Section 851.5 that court already has jurisdic-
tion over the controversy.72
Furthermore, the Committee argued that the probate court (which
is presided over by a superior court judge) is as equally competent
to decide title problems as a superior court sitting as the court of
original jurisdiction,73 and that the costs to heirs would not be in-
creased but on the contrary should be diminished through disposition
by the probate court rather than awaiting disposition on the more
crowded general superior court calendars. 74  Thd shorter length of
the trial in probate should result in even lower costs. In addition,
it appears that the arguments advanced by the Committee on Adminis-
tration of Justice concerning increased extraordinary fees for attorneys
involved in trying title directly in the probate proceedings can be re-
futed. Whether in the probate court or the superior court exercising
its general jurisdiction, the issue of title will be tried. The personal
representative and the estate, through the attorney for the estate or
some other attorney, would have to defend or litigate the title ques-
tion in the regular civil action just as he would in the probate proceed-
ings. Fees would be paid for this service. Thus it could be argued
that fees for either procedure-trying title in the probate court or in
the normal civil action in the superior court-would be approxi-
mately the same. In both cases, it would seem that the attorney would
be paid from the funds of the estate for such services. 75  It is difficult
to see how the new procedure established by Section 851.5 would
increase these attorneys' fees.
Finally, in answer to the argument that a jury trial would be denied
to the litigants who would normally have a right to one, the Committee
on Probate and Trust Law stated that generally title problems are
of such a technical nature that juries are not often invoked, especially
in actions to merely quiet title to property.7 6 However, again, nothing
71. Letter from Brent M. Abel, Member of Board of Governors of the State Bar
of California and past Chairman of the State Bar Committee on Probate and Trusts,
to the Pacific Law Journal, Jan. 26, 1973; STATE BA, OF CALIFORNIA, 1967 CONFERENCE
RESOLUTION No. 65.
72. See Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956);
In re Kurt's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 681, 189 P.2d 528 (1948).
73. Abel, supra 71.
74. Id.
75. CAL. PROB. CODE §§902, 910, 911.
76. Abel, supra 71.
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in Assembly Bill 1812 expressly denies the right to a jury trial, and
in cases where a jury may be demanded, that right seemingly still
exists.
The confusing mass of case law exceptions to the general privity
rule in California has been simplified into one procedure by Assembly
Bill 1812. Under Assembly Bill 1812, any party, whether interested
in or adverse to an estate, may have his claim to an estate asset liti-
gated in the probate court. In the future, however, this simplified
procedure may be in jeopardy by enactment in California of the Uni-
form Probate Code.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
The California Legislature has constantly updated and revised the
California Probate Code. As a result, the existing probate procedure
is more advanced than that of most other states.7  The Board of
Governors of the State Bar of California has had the Uniform Probate
Code under intensive study for over three years since its promulgation
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in August 1969.78 In the 1973 Legislative Session a bill was intro-
duced"9 which would repeal the present California Probate Code and
replace it with the Uniform Probate Code. 0
The heart of the Uniform Code is its "flexible administration" provi-
sions, i.e., the option by the personal representative to either seek court
supervision or to act without it within the same proceeding.8' In rela-
tion to these provisions, a report prepared by the State Bar of Califor-
nia82 expressed the opinion that the Uniform Probate Code in Califor-
nia would not be in the best interest of the citizens of this state and
would provide an inadequate safeguard of the public's interest:
The citizens of the State of California could profit from a form
of independent administration to parallel its present supervised
form of administration, but the form of independent administra-
tion suggested by the Uniform Probate Code is so devoid of fun-
damental safeguards that the advantages it offers in the ordinary,
competently administered estate are far outweighed by the poten-
tial injury to the unwary in the incompetently or dishonestly ad-
ministered estate.8
3
77. 46 CAL. S.B.J. 290 (1971).
78. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE 1 (Mar. 1973). This report is available at the office of the State Bar of
California, 926 "J" Street, Sacramento, Calif., 95814.
79. S.B. 1, 1973 Regular Session, as introduced, Jan. 8, 1973.
80. See 8 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (1972).
81. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §3-301 et seq., §3-501 et seq., §3-701 et seq.
82. STATE BA. OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 78.
83. Id. at 2.
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The State Bar of California recommends that California retain its
"in ren" theory of probate. "To abandon it in favor of the personal
jurisdiction of the informal procedure of the Uniform Probate Code
is to create unnecessary delays and vexatious uncertainty in finally
terminating liability. '8 4 The Ad Hoc Committee on The Uniform Pro-
bate Code concluded that to provide minimum safeguards, the admin-
istration of estates must include initiation of the proceedings by formal
steps judicially supervised, and conclusion of the proceedings through
final distributions ordered by the Court."5  One specific reason for
its insistence on these safeguards is that a proceeding which commences
with requirements of notice to all persons having any possible interest
in the estate is desirable to assure finality within constitutional limi-
tations and to determine title to real and personal property with the
certainty necessary to meet due process and related requirements.80
Presumably this procedure would include notice to persons who may
fall into the category of adverse claimants to title of an estate asset.
Just what effect the Uniform Probate Code, as codified by Senate
Bill 1, would have on the probate court's jurisdiction to try title with
an adverse claimant remains somewhat unclear. First, Section 3-105
of the Uniform Code states that persons interested in a decedent's
estate may apply to the registrar for determination in the informal
proceedings, and may petition the court for orders in formal proceed-
ings within the court's jurisdiction including but not limited to those
described in Division 3 of the Code. "Interested person" is defined
in Section 1-201(t) as heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, ben-
eficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against
a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person
which might be affected by the proceeding. It is arguable that "an
interested person" could include a person with an adverse claim to
property of the decedent, thus retaining probate court jurisdiction over
such matters as is the case now under Probate Code Section 851.5. This
contention is supported by the comment to Section 3-105 of the Uni-
form Probate Code which states that "the estate court, whatever it
is called, should have unlimited power to hear and finally dispose
of all matters relevant to determination of the extent of the decedent's
estate and of the claims against it."
Section 3-105 further provides that the probate court has exclusive
jurisdiction of formal proceedings to determine how decedent's estates
subject to the laws of this state are to be administered, expended,
84. 46 CAL. S.BJ. 291 (1971).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 292.
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and distributed. It has concurrent jurisdiction of any other action
or proceeding concerning a succession, or to which an estate, through
a personal representative, may be a party, including actions to deter-
mine title to property alleged to belong to the estate. Construing
this provision with the above discussion, and considering that the ad-
verse claimant was not expressly precluded from consideration in the
probate court on title matters, the Uniform Probate Code could be
interpreted as allowing such litigation of adverse claimants in con-
fortuity with the present Section 851.5 of the Probate Code.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the "concurrent jurisdic-
tion" procedure may indicate a retreat from this position, depending
on how the courts will apply past case law to the jurisdiction issue.
As mentioned above, prior tor Assembly Bill 1812, an adverse claim-
ant's remedy was a civil suit in the superior court's general jurisdiction,
unless he could bring himself within one of the exceptions to the gen-
eral privity rule. Since Senate Bill 1 will repeal the present Probate
Code, and the Uniform Probate Code contains no section which speci-
fically provides for the problem of an adverse claimant, the courts
may be forced to rely on the old privity rule contained within case
law and the various exceptions thereto, to litigate these title ques-
tions. Thus the disadvantages of that system as expressed by the pro-
ponents of Assembly Bill 1812 (i.e., multiplicity of suits, unnecessary
time expended by the parties) may resurface in the California law
in that area of probate court jurisdiction.
The interpretation according to "pre-Assembly Bill 1812" law may
be strengthened by Uniform Probate Code Section 3-106 and com-
ment thereto, which concern the proper notice required to be given
to parties involved in litigation in cases when the probate court has
exclusive jurisdiction. Section 3-106 provides that in proceedings
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court where notice is required
by this code or by rule, interested persons may be bound by the orders
of the court in respect to property in or subject to the laws of this
state by notice or in conformity with Section 1-401. Such order is
binding as to all who are given notice of the proceeding though less
than all interested persons are notified. Section 1-401 explains the
procedural requirements for the giving of notice to any person inter-
ested in the subject of the hearing of a petition. The significance
of Section 3-106 as it would concern an adverse claimant is contained
in the comment to Section 3-106. The comment specifically addresses
itself to the situation where probate matters are assigned to a branch
of a single court of general jurisdiction-in that case, a division of
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powers of the courts, i.e., general superior court versus probate court, into
"exclusive" and "concurrent" may be inappropriate. The comment
suggests two different approaches to this situation. One of the sugges-
tions is as follows:
Subject to general rules concerning the proper location of civil
litigation and jurisdiction of persons, the court (meaning the pro-
bate division) may hear and determine any other controversy con-
cerning a succession or to which an estate, through a personal rep-
resentative, may be a party.
The comment expressly states that in the unusual circumstance where
there is only one court of general jurisdiction to which probate matters
are assigned, the probate court could then decide any other controversy
concerning the estate. By implication, it is arguable that when there
are two courts with concurrent jurisdiction (as per Section 3-105),
the provision on concurrent jurisdiction could be interpreted to require
something more than just "any title claim" to allow a claim to be
litigated in the probate court. Again, however, no section of the Uni-
form Probate Code expressly precludes the probate court from litigat-
ing an adverse claim to the estate, and this issue would require interpre-
tation by case law. Prior to Assembly Bill 1812, case law on this
issue expressly limited the ability of an adverse claimant to try title
in probate. If this would be the construction of Section 3-105 of
the Uniform Probate Code, the whole issue of probate court jurisdic-
tion would again be clouded with the general privity requirement
as modified by the several exceptions previously mentioned. Section
3-105 grants broad subject matter jurisdiction to the probate court
which covers a proceeding initiated for any purpose other than those
covered by more explicit provisions (i.e., testacy proceedings). But
whether this broad subject matter jurisdiction would include the power
of the probate court to litigate title when there is an adverse claimant
to the estate is questionable.
The better approach, at least as far as California law is concerned,
appears to be the procedure established by the present Probate Code
Section 851.5, as recommended by the State Bar of California. The
confusion in the past case law has been clarified; to revert back to
that confusion by enactment of the Uniform Probate Code seems un-
necessary and even detrimental to efficient probate court proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The rule established by Assembly Bill 1812, clarifying the law in
California concerning trying title in probate proceedings when there
184
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is an adverse claimant, provides that anyone with a claim to a dece-
dent's property may now have it litigated in the probate proceedings
if he complies with established procedures.
It appears that any uncertainty created by case law with regard
to probate court jurisdiction to try title to property has been elimi-
nated. The artificial distinction made in the case of husband and
wife litigating the interest in the deceased spouse's estate has also been
eliminated. The other exceptions included efforts by the courts to
find some remote connection with the probate proceeding to establish
the "requisite privity" to allow the adverse claimant to try title therein.
This judicial backbending is now unnecessary under the new rule.
As stated by the State Bar Committee on Administration of Justice,
any objections or problems raised concerning the new procedure may
or may not have validity. Litigation in the area will provide the an-
swer. Some special problems mentioned by the Committee which
would be readily apparent are the harm to the parties for lack of
a jury trial, the inflated attorneys' fees, and the delay in distribution
to the beneficiaries of the deceased.
However, in light of the several exceptions engrafted upon the old
privity rule which resulted in uncertainty and inconsistent procedures
concerning probate court jurisdiction to try title, the simplified proce-
dure of Assembly Bill 1812 seems to be the logical answer to provide
a practical and workable solution, as opposed to a piecemeal and case-
by-case treatment.
Considering the ambiguous provisions contained within the Uniform
Probate Code relating to probate court jurisdiction in this area of ad-
verse claimants to an estate asset, it is suggested that the legislature
only adopt as much of the Code as will allow it to retain the specific
procedure set forth in Section 851.5 of the present California Probate
Code. This procedure would leave no room for the courts to interpret
the Uniform Probate Code in line with the confusing case law excep-
tions which existed prior to Assembly Bill 1812 and would establish
with some certainty the law in the area of trying title to assets in
an estate in the probate court.
Nancy Sweet
